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Abstract  –  Many  Continental  European  countries  recently  reformed  their  bankruptcy 
legislations  to  stimulate  reorganization  and  firm  survival.  We  show  that  the  Belgian  1997 
bankruptcy  code  reform,  which  implemented  several  international  best  practice 
recommendations, significantly reduced aggregate small and micro business bankruptcy rates. 
However, using distributed lag models to control for the relationship between bankruptcy rates 
and macroeconomic variables such as real GDP growth, consumer confidence, inflation, etc., 
we find that the new code’s impact is not the same for all types of companies. Specifically, 
while  the  beneficial  effect  of  the  reform  is  largely  similar  between  small  firms  (i.e.  stock 
corporations) and micro firms (i.e. partnerships), it is only significant in certain industries 
(manufacturing  and  trade).  Overall,  our  results  indicate  that  solely  the  reforms  aimed  at 
limiting domino bankruptcy effects have had a substantial impact. Our findings have several 
policy implications for the evaluation and modification of the bankruptcy system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During  the  last  decade  many  countries  in  the  European  Union  reformed  their  bankruptcy 
legislations (e.g. France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Finland). Several other EU members are 
planning comparable overhauls (e.g.  Italy and the Netherlands). The goal of these reforms 
typically  was  to  transform  a  19
th  century  framework,  solely  focused  on  liquidation,  into  a 
legislation encompassing both a reorganization and liquidation chapter as is the case in the 
U.S.  Thereby  legislators  hoped  to  realize  a  more  transparent  and  efficient  system,  which 
encourages reorganization as much as possible, as reflected in the European Commission’s or 
the World Bank’s guidelines for best practice bankruptcy procedures (EC, 2003; World Bank, 
2001).  This implies that changes to the bankruptcy system should have an effect on aggregate 
bankruptcy  rates,  defined  as  the  percentage  of  liquidation  type  bankruptcies  to  the  total 
company population (Liu and Wilson, 2002; Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996; Vlieghe, 2001). 
 
All over Europe, the vast majority of bankruptcy cases concerns SMEs (cf. Hudson, 
1986)
1. Consequently, the reduction of the bankruptcy rates of small businesses should be a 
particularly  important  goal  of  a  bankruptcy  reform.  However,  not  all  aspects  of  such  an 
overhaul are necessarily beneficial or useful for smaller firms. The same holds true across 
different  business  sectors.  This  could  be  important,  as  some  industries  are  more  heavily 
represented in a country’s economy than others. Preceding issues have so far received little 
attention  in  the  literature.  Moreover,  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  bankruptcy 
legislation  reform  on  aggregate  bankruptcy  rates  in  a  Continental  European  setting  is  not 
available. Because the bank based financial system in these countries is substantially different 
from  the  market  based  Anglo-Saxon  environment,  the  impact  of  reforms  in  the  former 
countries is not necessarily comparable to that of reforms in the latter. Furthermore this also 
begs the question about the effect on bankruptcy rates of the implementation of international   3 
best practice recommendations in Continental Europe. As discussed below, the main goal of 
this paper is to look into these issues by evaluating the impact of legal reform on aggregate 
bankruptcy rates for different types of small and micro businesses in a typical bank based 
Continental European country, viz. Belgium. 
 
Research on corporate failure focuses either on firm specific bankruptcy prediction
2 or 
on modeling aggregate bankruptcy rates. In the latter type of work macroeconomic factors play 
an important role. Hudson (1986), Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999) and Liu (2004), among many 
others,  find  that  general  macroeconomic  variables  (such  as  GDP  growth  or  business  cycle 
indicators) are negatively related to aggregate failure rates. Also aggregate corporate birth rates 
(e.g. Hudson, 1986, 1997; Johnson and Parker, 1994) and inflation (Altman, 1983; Wadhwani, 
1986, among others) prove to have an impact, but here the nature of the relationship may be 
either positive or negative. Specific empirical evidence on the impact of the macroeconomic 
environment on the failure of small and micro businesses is scarce. Chen and Williams (1999) 
examine state by state failure rates in the U.S. and find that government assistance programs 
lower bankruptcy rates in high-technology industries. Everett and Watson (1998) use data on 
small  Australian  retail  businesses  and  show  that  between  30%  and  50%  of  failures  are 
associated with economy wide factors. Using survey data Peterson et al. (1983) show that 
macroeconomic factors are the number two and three perceived reasons for small business 
failure in the US, while Sullivan et al. (1999) document that outside business conditions are the 
most mentioned reasons for filing bankruptcy.  Similarly,  for  Belgium, credit data provider 
Graydon  finds  in  its  surveys  that  owners  and  managers  of  failed  businesses  as  well  as 
bankruptcy judges point to bad general economic conditions as a major cause of bankruptcy 
(Graydon Belgium, 2002, 2003).  
   4 
Next to the general macroeconomic environment, the impact of institutional factors on 
aggregate failure rates has been receiving more and more attention. In a recent study, Claessens 
and Klapper (2005) document that the use of formal bankruptcy around the world is related to 
design  features  of  bankruptcy  legislation.  Furthermore,  the  research  on  the  effects  of 
institutional change confirms the important impact of legal reform on aggregate failure rates, at 
least for Anglo-Saxon countries. For instance, Turner et al. (1992) show that the policies of the 
Thatcher government in the early 1980s strongly increased the business cycle sensitivity of 
corporate liquidations. Concerning the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act in the U.S., the empirical 
literature  predominantly  focuses  on  personal  bankruptcies  (Chapter  13  procedures),  and 
documents that the procedure’s use significantly increased after the introduction of the Act 
(e.g. Domowitz and Eovaldi, 1993; Nelson, 2000). In addition, Boyes and Faith (1986) find 
that the 1978 reform also increased the number of corporate bankruptcy filings. Fisher and 
Martel (2003) show that the 1992 Canadian bankruptcy reform stimulated the number of filed 
corporate  reorganization  proposals.  Finally,  concerning  the  U.K.’s  1986  Insolvency  Act, 
Cuthbertson and Hudson (1988) and Vlieghe (2001) find a significant decrease in the corporate 
liquidation rate after implementation of the reform. Liu and Wilson (2002) and Liu (2004) 
confirm this and indicate that the beneficial effect of the Act diminishes after about four years.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature on macroeconomic determinants of aggregate 
bankruptcy rates by documenting the impact of a reform implementing several international 
best practice recommendations on bankruptcy legislation in Belgium, a Continental European 
country with a bank based financial system.  Furthermore, and novel to the literature, we look 
at the impact of bankruptcy reform on the aggregate bankruptcy rates of different types of 
small and micro businesses. Specifically, after controlling for a wide variety of macroeconomic 
processes,  we  separately  examine  the  most  important  industry  groups  (manufacturing,   5 
construction,  trade  and  services)  and  the  two  dominant  limited  liability  legal  forms 
(partnerships and stock corporations). These legal forms proxy for size classes: partnerships are 
typically  used  by  micro  firms  while  most  small  sized  firms  take  the  form  of  a  stock 
corporation. This stratification approach allows us to get a much clearer picture of the reform’s 
impact,  which  turns  out  to  be  quite  different  across  company  types.  We  also  link  these 
differences to key features of the reform. Previewing our main results, we find that only the 
measures taken to limit domino bankruptcy effects have had a significant impact, and that 
solely firms in manufacturing and trade benefited. In these two industries the reform succeeded 
in  lowering  bankruptcy  rates  for  both  small  and  micro  firms.  Bankruptcy  rates  in  other 
industries, however, were not affected.   
 
  The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  discusses  the  most 
important changes of the 1997 Belgian bankruptcy reform and their potential implications for 
bankruptcy  rates  across  different  groups  of  companies.  Data,  univariate  statistics  and 
methodological issues are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 reports the empirical results and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Belgian 1997 Bankruptcy Reform and Aggregate Bankruptcy Rates 
 
 
With its bankruptcy legislation of 1997, Belgium replaced existing rules dating back to 1853.
3  
In line with international best practice recommendations (e.g. from the European Commission 
or the World Bank), the new code introduced several mechanisms to reduce corporate failure 
rates. The three most important ones are discussed below.  
   6 
The first novelty concerns the introduction of a formal reorganization procedure which 
has  many  features  in  common  with  legal  reorganization  rules  abroad  (e.g.  the  French 
“redressement judiciaire”, U.S. Chapter 11 or the British administration procedure; see Kaiser, 
1996).
4 A company that is granted reorganization protection receives creditor protection for up 
to six months. During that time a reorganization plan is worked out which has to be approved 
by the majority of creditors and the bankruptcy court. If a plan is confirmed, the company can 
stay under the court’s protection for as long as three years. Throughout the procedure, the 
reorganizing firm’s management is assisted and supervised by a court appointed administrator.
5  
 
Secondly, the new legislation also introduced an early warning system for financial 
distress through the creation of “chambers of commercial research” as part of the bankruptcy 
courts. These units have to actively investigate the viability of firms within their jurisdiction. 
An investigation may be triggered by complaints from clients and suppliers, fiscal and social 
security administrations or auditors, or be the result of the chamber’s analysis of a company’s 
financial statements. If the court decides that the problems could threaten a firm’s continuity, it 
informs the management of its legal options, including a formal reorganization or bankruptcy 
procedure.  However,  these  chambers  have  few  opportunities  to  take  action  because  of  the 
limited amount of resources available to them. 
 
Thirdly, a number of adjustments to the liquidation procedure were introduced to 
reduce the occurrence of domino effects, i.e. suppliers are thrown into financial distress due to 
the bankruptcy of their clients (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Boissay and Monnet, 2003). The 
main measure concerns the acknowledgement of retention of title for goods which have been 
delivered but not yet paid. In fact it is interesting to note that Belgium was the last country in 
the European Union (with the exception of Luxemburg) to implement this principle and make   7 
retention of title “insolvency resistant” (Milo, 2004). In terms of reduction of risk, this measure 
has  two  important  dimensions.  From  the  perspective  of  a  firm’s  suppliers,  it  offers  more 
security of receiving payment. From the perspective of the company itself, it reduces possible 
losses on its outstanding customer invoices, and is a substitute – at least to some extent – for 
insurance on its portfolio of accounts receivables. As discussed below, this risk reduction may 
also alleviate credit rationing problems.
6 
 
The beneficial impact of preceding measures may differ according to the size of the 
firm.  In particular, we would expect that the first two components of the reform discussed 
above  are  less  beneficial  for  micro  firms  as  compared  to  small  companies.  Specifically,  a 
formal  reorganization  procedure  typically  entails  costs  of  which  the  relative  importance  is 
inversely related to firm size (Branch, 2002; Ravid and Sundgren, 1998). Ceteris paribus, this 
is likely to deter micro firms from applying for reorganization. Furthermore, in view of their 
limited resources, the commercial research chambers are unlikely to focus much of their early 
warning activities on micro companies.  
 
Concerning the anti-domino measures, it is not a priori clear what type of firm is likely 
to benefit most. In particular, as the retention of title offers more security to suppliers, it should 
improve  the  availability  of  trade  credit.  The  findings  in  the  literature  suggest  that,  ceteris 
paribus, micro companies may benefit more as this form of credit is likely to be relatively more 
important  to  them  (e.g.  Berger  and  Udell,  1998;  Petersen  and  Rajan,  1997).  From  the 
perspective of accounts receivables, this same retention of title reduces losses if clients do not 
pay. This could again be more beneficial for micro firms as they may be hit harder by a client’s 
failure. However, as discussed above, the retention of title also offers firms a form of insurance 
on  their  portfolio  of  accounts  receivables.  For  companies  in  which  these  assets  absorb  a   8 
significant  fraction  of  total  assets,  reduction  of  exposure  on  accounts  receivables  is  an 
important  element  in  loan  decisions  of  banks,  especially  if  the  firm’s  financial  health  is 
mediocre. As bank credit is a more important source of funds for small firms as compared to 
micro companies (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002; Hughes, 1997), this latter argument suggests 
that, in terms of alleviating credit constraints from banks, the retention of title offers the former 
group of firms more advantages.  
 
When comparing across industry groups, effects may differ as well. In particular, the 
creation of a formal reorganization procedure is likely to benefit the least those firms that have 
many assets that can be used as collateral. Specifically, although availability of collateral helps 
to obtain credit, Bergström et al. (2002) find evidence that when the company falls on hard 
times, secured creditors push for liquidation and are likely to oppose a reorganization plan. 
Relative  to  other  industries,  firms  in  trade  and  manufacturing  are  likely  to  have  more 
collateralable assets, and hence, ceteris paribus, are more likely to meet with opposition of 
secured debt holders when they attempt to file for a reorganization procedure. By contrast, the 
measures taken in the framework of reducing domino effects should especially benefit trade 
and manufacturing firms. In view of their important inventories, companies in these industries 
should benefit most from the advantages of the introduction of retention of title (increased 
access to trade credit, better possibilities to reclaim unpaid sales and improved access to bank 
debt). Finally, ceteris paribus, one would not expect the creation of the chambers of early 
warning to impact differently across business sectors.   
 
The hypotheses from the preceding analysis are summarized in Table I. They suggest 
that, depending on which of the legal changes dominates, the total impact of the reform on   9 




Table I about here 
******************** 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Data and Variables 
 
Under  Belgian  accounting  law,  limited  liability  companies  have  an  obligation  to  annually 
deposit financial statements at the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). All of these companies 
are included in the NBB legal status database, which records the exact date of all start-ups, 
voluntary liquidations, mergers & acquisitions, bankruptcies, formal reorganizations, etc. On 
the basis of the information in the legal status database, for each quarter of the period 1986-
2002, we calculate aggregate failure rates based on the number of companies that entered the 
liquidation type bankruptcy procedure in a specific quarter, and the total number of registered 
companies at the beginning of that quarter. In view of our focus on small and micro businesses, 
we  exclude  companies  filing  complete  annual  accounts.
7  To  evaluate  the  impact  of  the 
bankruptcy  reform  on  different  classes  of  companies,  we  compute  separate  failure  rates 
according to legal company type and industry classification.  
 
As the legal status database does not contain any explicit size information, we proxy for 
company  size  by  distinguishing  between  the  two  dominant  legal  types  of  limited  liability 
companies:  partnerships  (BVBA/SPRL)  and  stock  corporations  (NV/SA).  Partnerships  are 
private companies with low capital requirements (minimum capital of 18,550 EUR, of which   10 
only  6,200  EUR  needs  to  be  available  at  formation)  which  are  managed  by  one  or  more 
officially  appointed  managers,  usually  partners.  All  shares  are  registered  and  have  limited 
transferability.
8  Stock  corporations  have  much  higher  capital  requirements:  a  minimum  of 
61,500 EUR needs to be available at the date of incorporation. These firms are managed by a 
board of directors with at least three members. Shares can be registered or anonymous, and are 
freely transferable. In practice, micro firms are typically organized as a partnership; once the 
activities demand a larger amount of capital, firms tend to take the form of a stock corporation. 
This phenomenon is clearly observable in the BelFirst financial statement database. For 2003, 
for example, the median stock corporation was about 4.6 times larger (in terms of total assets) 
than the median partnership.
9  
 
Following e.g. Harhoff et al. (1998), we apply a broad industry classification system 
which identifies four major industry groups: manufacturing, construction, trade (i.e. wholesale 
& retail) and business services (excluding financials). This ensures that the quarterly number of 
bankruptcies per industry group is large enough to avoid erratic movements in the bankruptcy 
rate. 
 
Based  on  the  literature  discussed  above,  we  select  a  number  of  macroeconomic 
variables that could be related to the corporate bankruptcy rate. A first group of variables are 
indicators of the state of the economy as a whole: real GDP growth, the consumer confidence 
index (CCI), the NBB business cycle indicator and the OECD composite leading indicator for 
the euro zone countries. In addition, we include aggregate corporate birth rates, consumer price 
based  inflation,  and  the  return  on  the  Belgian  All  Shares  (BAS)  stock  index.  The 
macroeconomic time-series data was collected from various official sources, including the IMF 
international  financial  statistics  (consumer  confidence  index  and  GDP  levels),  Belgostat   11 
(inflation, NBB business cycle indicator and Belgian All Shares stock index) and the OECD 
(euro zone composite leading indicator). When relevant, the time series are seasonally adjusted 
using the Census X12 method. A concise overview of all variables and their definitions is 
given in Table II. 
 
******************** 
Table II about here 
******************** 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
A first intuitive glance at the potential impact of the bankruptcy reform can be obtained by 
plotting the failure rates through time. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the seasonally-adjusted 
quarterly small and micro business bankruptcy rate during the 17 years of the sample period 
(1986 to 2002), split up into a pre-and post reform period. The pre-reform period (period I) is 
additionally split up into the early years of the sample (period Ia: 1986-1991) and the years just 




Figure 1 about here 
******************** 
 
Immediately after the new code came into effect (January 1
st, 1998), the overall failure 
rate substantially decreased, creating a clear visual break in the time series’ evolution and 
ending an upward trend in failure rates. Part of this instantaneous impact must be attributed to 
adaptation problems: rulings got delayed as bankruptcy courts struggled to implement the new 
framework (hence the subsequent increase in failure rates during the second quarter of 1998).  
   12 
The summary statistics in Table III show that over the total sample period 53,652 firms 
failed. The Table also reports median bankruptcy rates for the total sample of all small and 
micro  limited  liability  companies,  and  for  each  legal  form  and  industry  group  separately. 
Notwithstanding the break in the time series at the time of the reform, median failure rates are 
not lower in the 5 years post reform as compared to the preceding 12 years (period I vs. period 
II). However, bankruptcy rates do appear to be lower after the introduction of the code than 
during the years just before (period Ib vs. period II). Table 3 also shows differences in median 
failure rates across legal forms and industry groups. As compared to partnerships, failure rates 
are  systematically  lower  for  stock  corporations.  This  is  not  surprising,  in  view  of  the 
differences  in  size,  capitalization  and  governance  requirements  mentioned  in  the  previous 
Section. Failure rates also vary across industry groups. These differences are less stable over 
time, although, in general, construction has the highest failure rates and services the lowest.  
 
******************** 
Table III about here 
******************** 
 
Finally, the data on macro variables indicate that economic conditions also significantly 
varied over time.
11 As these conditions may have an important impact on failure rates, this 
stresses the need to control for the former to get a clear picture of the reform’s effect.  
 
3.3. Methodology 
In  accordance  with  the  standard  methodology  in  the  aggregate  failure  rate  literature  from 
Altman (1983) onwards, we assume that the corporate bankruptcy rate (BR) is a function of a 
number of macroeconomic variables, which can be expressed as a finite distributed lag (FDL) 
model:   13 
BRt = 
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Where          k  = maximum lag length 
          X  = macroeconomic variable 
          ε  = error term 
   
The  direct  estimation  of  such  a  model  could  involve  multicollinearity  problems 
between different lagged variables and is costly in terms of degrees of freedom. Both issues 
can be addressed by an Almon polynomial distributed lag (PDL) specification. It can be shown 
that any βi in equation (1) can be approximated by a polynomial of order m: 
 
βi =b0 + b1 i + b2 i
2+ …+ bm i
m               (2) 
 
Substituting (2) into (1) leads to: 
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Where         l   = number of macroeconomic variables 
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OLS will lead to best linear unbiased estimators in equation (3) as long as ε fulfils the 
standard least squares assumptions (Gujarati, 1995). Individual β coefficients from equation (1) 
can  then  be  calculated  from  the  polynomials.  The  sum  of  these ˆ β s  reflects  the  long  run 
relationship  between  the  macroeconomic  variable  and  the  bankruptcy  rate.  As  most   14 
macroeconomic variables are integrated of order one (unit root), equation (3) is estimated in 
differences.
12 Following common practice of measuring growth in macroeconomic indicators, 
all  variables  are  expressed  as  one  year  changes.  This  should  also  help  in  eliminating  any 
remaining seasonality issues.  
 
 
4. Tests and Results 
 
Because  macroeconomic  variables  are  highly  correlated  through  time
13,  we  first  estimate 
distributed lag models that contain only one such variable. Next we build models containing 
multiple macroeconomic proxies to improve model fit while limiting correlation as much as 
possible.  
 
4.1. Models with a Single Macroeconomic Variable 
The results of polynomial distributed lag (PDL) models that express the relationship between a 
single  macroeconomic  variable  and  total  small  and  micro  business  bankruptcy  rates  are 
reported in Table IV. The optimal lag length and the order of the polynomials were chosen on 
the basis of the Schwartz information criterion.
14 To limit the size of the Tables, we only report 




Table IV about here 
********************* 
 
The  left  hand  panel  of  Table  IV  reports  models  that  do  not  take  into  account  the 
possibility of a regime change. The results confirm that changes in macroeconomic variables   15 
are significantly linked to changes in small and micro business bankruptcy rates. Based on 
Newey-West HAC standard errors, the sum of the lag term coefficients proves to be significant 
for  all  seven  models.
16  The  long  run  relationship  between  all  proxies  and  failure  rates  is 
negative. For stock market returns and the general state of the economy proxies – real GDP 
(∆GDP), the NBB business cycle indicator (∆CYCLE), consumer confidence index (∆CCI) 
and  the  euro  zone  composite  leading  indicator  (∆EUROZONE)  –  this  is  in  line  with 
expectations. The negative relationship with inflation (∆INFL) is consistent with e.g. Altman 
(1983) who argues that inflation helps companies survive by reducing competitiveness, and by 
passing  higher  input  prices  through  to  consumers.  The  negative  sign  for  changes  in  the 
corporate birth rate (∆BIRTHS) suggests that the positive multiplier effects of corporate births, 
discussed  in  Johnson  and  Parker  (1994)  (i.e.  new  company  formations  increase  overall 
business activity and create opportunities) outweigh the negative ones (i.e. many companies 
fail during the first few years after start-up). Model fit, in terms of the adjusted R², is lowest for 
the GDP growth model (∆GDP), and highest for the consumer confidence index model (∆CCI). 
Next, Chow breakpoint tests to assess a possible structural break in the first quarter of 1998 – 
when the new code came into effect – were run for each model. The Chow test statistics are 
highly  significant  for  six  out  of  seven  models  (null  hypothesis  is  no  structural  break). 
Therefore, we add a jump dummy variable (CODE) which has a value of 1 after the new 
legislation came into effect. Results of the break-adjusted models are reported in the right-hand 
panel of Table IV.  
 
The CODE dummy is significant for all models, and substantially increases model fit. 
Also  note  that  the  inclusion  of  the  CODE  dummy  does  not  significantly  change  the  lag 
coefficients’ sums, which indicates that the basic relationships between the macroeconomic 
variables and bankruptcy rates are not very different before and after the reform.
17 Preceding   16 
findings thus imply that bankruptcy rates in the post reform period are lower than one would 
expect, given the macroeconomic conditions.
18  
 
4.2. Models with Multiple Macroeconomic Variables 
Multicollinearity is an important issue in the construction of a model with multiple proxies for 
the  state  of  the  economy.  We  therefore  estimate  a  model  containing  only  one  general 
macroeconomic indicator (the consumer confidence index, as Table IV shows it leads to the 
best  fit),  supplemented  by  the  corporate  birth  rate,  inflation  and  the  jump  dummy  for  the 
change of bankruptcy code. However, as a robustness check, models optimizing fit regardless 
of correlation have been estimated as well.
19 Findings are consistent with those reported.  
 
               The first set of results is shown in Table V. Column A reports the results if our model 
is used to explain overall small and micro business bankruptcy rates, while column B and C 
contain the findings for stock corporations and partnerships respectively. Column A confirms 
the results of Table IV: bankruptcy rates decline as consumer confidence (∆CCI), inflation 
(∆INFL) and corporate births (∆BIRTHS) increase, while the CODE dummy remains highly 
significant with a negative sign. Columns B and C show a negative and highly significant 
CODE dummy too. The coefficients indicate a slightly stronger beneficial impact for stock 




Table V about here 
********************* 
   17 
The adjusted R²s indicate that the aggregate bankruptcy rate of stock corporations can 
be better explained by macroeconomic conditions than those of partnerships, which is likely 
due to a greater importance of company specific failure causes in micro sized companies (e.g. 
lack of management expertise).  It is also interesting to note that the failure rates of the two 
legal types react differently to macro conditions. Specifically, a rise in the stock corporation 
birth rate (∆BIRTHSStock Corporation) leads to a lower bankruptcy rate of these firms, while no 
significant  relationship  exists  for  partnerships  (∆BIRTHSPartnerships).
21  Consistent  with  the 
discussion above, a potential explanation may be found in the fact that the two types of legal 
forms attract different kinds of start-ups. Because of the higher entry requirements, availability 
of good business opportunities is likely to be relatively more important for the birth of stock 
corporations. Hence, in line with the multiplier reasoning in Johnson and Parker (1994), a high 
birth rate is associated with a lower failure rate for these types of firms. By contrast, because of 
the low capital requirements and the weak governance demands, failures shortly after company 
formation more than offset the beneficial effect of good business opportunities in the case of 
partnerships. Furthermore, changes in inflation (∆INFL), are only significantly negative for 
partnerships,  which  could  indicate  –  consistent  with  preceding  discussion  –  that  the  extra 
breathing room provided by rising inflation is relatively more important for micro companies. 
Finally, the impact of general economic conditions (∆CCI) may be somewhat more important 
in explaining corporate failure for stock corporations as compared to partnerships
22, but the 
difference in coefficients is not significant. In sum, and most importantly, the data show that 
both  legal  types  benefit  from  the  1997  reform,  and  that,  although  small  firms  (i.e.  stock 
corporations) may benefit more than micro companies (i.e. partnerships), the difference is not 
statistically significant.  
 
 
   18 
********************* 
Table VI about here 
********************* 
 
Table VI shows the results when we the model the bankruptcy rates of the four main 
industry groups separately: manufacturing, construction, trade and services (columns D, E, F 
and G respectively).
23 The bankruptcy rate of all industries dwindles with improving consumer 
confidence (∆CCI). A similar result holds for the birth rate (∆BIRTHS), but the sum of the lag 
coefficients is only significant for firms in the services industry group (G). More importantly 
however,  the  coefficients  for  the  CODE  dummy  are  only  significantly  negative  in  the 
manufacturing  and  trade  industry  models  (D  and  F).  For  the  other  industries,  the  CODE 
dummy  is  even  positive,  although  insignificant.  Hence,  the  evidence  suggests  that  the 
beneficial impact on failure rates brought about by the 1997 reform is completely attributable 
to its effect on only two of the four main industry groups. Taken together with our analysis in 
Section 2, these findings support the notion that the measures aimed at reducing domino effects 
are the main drivers of the reform’s impact: only firms in manufacturing and trade are capable 
of extracting significant benefits in terms of risk and credit constraint reduction, given their 
important use of trade credit to finance inventories and the fact that retention of title can easily 
be applied to their types of products. In fact, the preceding evidence does not support the idea 
of  a  beneficial  impact  of  the  formal  reorganization  procedure,  as  this  would  predict  the 
opposite  relationship:  industries  with  a  high  use  of  secured  debt  (such  as  trade  and 
manufacturing) should benefit the least. These results also shed light on the forces behind the 
beneficial impact of the reform on bankruptcy rates of small and micro firms documented 
above.  Specifically,  preceding  findings  and  arguments  suggest  that  the  significance  of  the 
CODE  dummy  in  the  models  of  Table  V  is  entirely  driven  by  small  and  micro  firms  in   19 
manufacturing  and  trade.  Table  VII  offers  direct  evidence  on  this  issue,  as  it  splits  up 




Table VII about here 
******************* 
 
Table VII shows that indeed the CODE dummies are only significant (and negative) for 
small and micro companies in manufacturing and trade. For stock corporations the impact is 
stronger, although the difference relative to partnerships is not significant. In other industries 
the reform did not have any effect, for neither legal form. Overall the results are consistent 
with  those  in  Tables  V  and  VI.  Again  the  adjusted  R
2  show  that  bankruptcy  rates  of 
partnerships  are  harder  to  explain  using  macroeconomic  variables.  Improving  consumer 
confidence (∆CCI) reduces bankruptcy  rates, but its impact tends to be stronger for stock 
corporations. Conversely, partnerships tend to benefit most from inflation (∆INFL). In sum, all 
empirical results support the hypothesis that the measures taken to stop domino effects are the 
main drivers of the decrease in bankruptcy rates, as only firms in manufacturing and trade 
benefit.  They  also  indicate  that  although  firm  specific  elements  are  more  important  in 
explaining  bankruptcy  for  partnerships,  both  small  and  micro  companies  in  the  former 





Belgium  reformed  its  bankruptcy  legislation  in  1997,  adopting  several  international  best 
practice recommendations. The data show that this reform has significantly reduced aggregate   20 
small and micro business failure rates. However, after controlling for macroeconomic factors 
such as real GDP growth, consumer confidence, stock market returns, corporate birth rates, 
inflation, etc., we find that the favorable effect of the reform is not equally important for all 
types of companies. Specifically, we find that only firms in manufacturing and trade have 
benefited from it. The evidence also indicates that this can be explained by the fact that only 
the measures aimed at limiting domino bankruptcy effects, in particular the acknowledgement 
of retention of title for  goods that have been delivered but not  yet paid, have triggered  a 
significant reduction in bankruptcy rates. Because of the important need for trade credit to 
finance inventories, their often substantial portfolio of accounts receivables, and the fact that 
retention of title can easily be applied to their type of products, firms in manufacturing and 
trade obtained opportunities to limit risks and alleviate credit constraints. In those industries 
both small and micro sized firms benefited from the reform. Although the impact on small 
firms (stock corporations) may have been somewhat stronger, the difference is not statistically 
significant. We find no evidence suggesting that the other two main measures of the reform, 
i.e. the creation of a formal reorganization procedure and an early warning system of financial 
distress, have meaningfully contributed to a reduction in bankruptcy rates of small and micro 
firms. 
 
Our findings have several policy implications. First, the introduction of low cost, low 
formality alternatives to the costly formal reorganization procedure (comparable to a “pre-
packaged” U.S. Chapter 11) may be more useful for small and micro firms
25, although the 
question could be raised whether or not formal reorganization bankruptcy is useful at all in a 
bank dominated, small business dominated economy (cf. Berkovitch and Israel, 1999; Hege, 
2003). Second, the evaluation of the success or failure of a complex legislative change requires 
sufficient detail. Analyses solely based on total failure rates may result in incomplete and even   21 
misleading  findings.  Third,  legislators  should  clearly  and  precisely  communicate  their 
expectations regarding a reform’s impact to all economic agents without raising expectations to 
an unwarranted level. The 1997 reform was originally presented as a global solution in which 
reorganization type bankruptcy would become the rule and liquidation type bankruptcy would 
be reduced to a method of last resort. In view of the paramount importance of small and micro 
firms in the Belgian economy, as well as other countries’ experiences in this area, this was 
never a realistic scenario. As a result, the reform has been extensively criticized in the financial 
press and has also suffered from an important loss of confidence in its effectiveness, which in 
turn – as shown by experiences abroad – may trigger a further decline in its effectiveness in 
practice. Finally, our empirical findings and preceding discussion imply that the design, the 
goals  and  the  communication  of  any  future  amendments  to  the  code  should  pay  foremost 
attention to the possibly varying implications for different classes of companies.  
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Notes
                                                 
1 This is a direct result of the importance of small businesses in the European economy: SMEs represent 99.8% of 
all companies (estimate for the European economic area + Switzerland; Source: European Commission 2003 
Observatory of European SMEs). The EU’s criteria for SME classification valid until Jan 1
st, 2005 were: 
Micro: less than 10 employees 
Small: less than 50 employees, net income < 7 million EUR, total assets < 5 million EUR 
Medium: less than 250 employees, net income < 40 million EUR, total assets < 27 million EUR. 
2 See Altman and Narayanan (1997) for an extensive international survey on corporate failure prediction models. 
3 The bankruptcy law of August 8, 1997 and the law on the reorganization procedure of July 17, 1997. Both came 
into effect on January 1, 1998 and will be referred to as the “code” in the remainder of the paper. Some minor 
legal-technical issues were solved by the law of September 4, 2002 (effective as of October 1, 2002). 
4 Formally, a reorganization code existed since 1887, and was updated in 1946. However this reorganization 
procedure had been in disuse for decades. 
5  Note  that  this  part  of  the  reform  has  in  principle  also  entailed  a  reduction  in  the  protection  of  privileged 
claimants (including e.g. mortgage holding banks, which are very important in Belgium’s bank-based financial 
system). Specifically, the stay on the execution of privileges has been strengthened and a reorganization plan may 
be confirmed even if a privileged debt holder objects.  In practice, these reductions of secured creditor rights are 
quite limited though and unlikely to significantly affect the latter’s debt providing behavior.  
6 Other changes comprise new procedures allowing for a quick start-up of a new company that continues all or 
part of the economic activities of the failed firm. In practice there prove to be many problems with the practical 
implementation of these new procedures and they are rarely used.  
7 Under Belgian accounting law, “large” companies are required to file complete (unconsolidated) accounts if they 
meet at least two of the following criteria: total assets exceeding 3.125 million euro, operating revenue exceeding 
6.25 million euro, or more than 50 full time equivalent employees. Companies with on average more than 100 full 
time equivalent employees are always classified as “large”, regardless of assets and revenue. All other (“small”) 
companies are allowed to file abbreviated accounts.  
8 To sell shares in a partnership, the authorisation of at least half of the other partners (representing at least 75% of 
shares) is required. 
9 For 2003, the BelFirst financial statement database from data provider Bureau Van Dijk EP contains financial 
statement information on 101,240 stock corporations and 159,927 partnerships.  Although it has the advantage of 
containing explicit size information, this database can unfortunately not be used to compute aggregate bankruptcy 
rates because companies in financial distress often violate the filing requirements so that no data is available. In 
addition, the database only contains reliable information from the middle of the 1990s onwards. 
10 This split is only used to improve the informational content of the univariate statistics and plays no role in the 
time series analysis of Section 4. 
11 Note that, for brevity, only the overall birth rate is reported in Table 3. The birth rates for the different legal 
forms and industry groups show a similar downward trend. Part of this negative trend is due to the definition of 
the corporate birth rate as the number of new companies divided by the number of existing companies (which 
steadily increases through time). As all models are estimated in differences, this does not affect regression results. 
12 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results for all variables available upon request. An alternative estimation method 
would  be  the  use  of  cointegration  analysis  and  vector  error  correction  models  (cf.  Liu  and  Wilson,  2002). 
However, the relatively limited length of the time series could result in robustness issues.  
13 Cross-correlograms available upon request. 
14 In general, a lag length of 8 periods and polynomials of order 3 result in the best fit. 
15 Individual lag results are available upon request. 
16  Note  that  the  fact  that  the  sum  of  lag  term  coefficients  is  significant  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  all 
coefficients for individual lags are significant. Vice versa, individual lag terms can be significant even if the sum 
of lag terms is not.  
17  Robustness  checks  (not  reported)  show  that  interaction  terms  between  the  CODE  dummy  and  the 
macroeconomic variables are not significant. 
18  To  give  an  idea  of  the  impact  in  real  terms,  the  median  coefficient  for  the  CODE  dummy  of  -0.0355 
corresponds to a decrease in the number of bankruptcies with 86.8 per quarter in the post reform period (i.e. an 
average reduction of 8.4% in the number of liquidation type bankruptcies).  
19 Available upon request. 
20 The same picture arises when univariate models (similar to those in Table 4) are estimated for each legal type 
separately (not reported). The Chow breakpoint tests point to a structural break in all stock corporation models 
and six out of seven partnership models. Moreover, the CODE dummy’s coefficients systematically indicate a 
slightly stronger impact for stock corporations. The differences with the corresponding partnership models are not 
statistically significant though.   23 
                                                                                                                                                          
21 Models using only one lag structure (not reported) show that the sum of lag coefficients for corporate birth rates 
would even be significantly positive in the case of partnerships. For both legal forms, the short term lags (up to 
three or four quarters) are negative and the longer term lags are positive, but their relative importance differs. 
22 A model containing only a lag structure for ∆CCI would have an adj. R² of 0.3632 for stock corporations and an 
adj. R² of 0.2162 for partnerships. 
23 As in panel A of Table 5, models that optimize fit generate results consistent with those reported here.  
24 This split also corrects for possible problems in comparability of findings between stock corporations and 
partnerships due to differences in industry composition of these two firm types. 
25 A similar recommendation was recently made by a task force of the employer’s organization VBO.   24 
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TABLE I  
Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Impact potentially most beneficial for  Legal Change 
Size  Industry 
Formal reorganization procedure  larger companies  industries with low use of secured 
debt   
Early warning system  larger companies  –                                       
Anti-domino measures (retention of 
title)  smaller or larger companies  industries with high use of 
inventories and trade credit    28 
TABLE II  
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable  Description 
∆BR  1-yr Change in Quarterly Small and Micro Business Bankruptcy Rate
a (%) 
∆GDP  1-yr Growth in Real GDP (%) 
∆CYCLE  1-yr Change in National Bank of Belgium’s Business Cycle Indicator (points) 
∆CCI  1-yr Change in Consumer Confidence Index (points) 
∆EUROZONE  1-yr Change in OECD euro zone Composite Leading Indicator (%) 
∆INFL  1-yr Change in Inflation (%, based on Consumer Price Index) 
∆STOCKS  1-yr Return on Belgian All Share Stock Index (%) 
∆BIRTHS  1-yr Change in Quarterly Corporate Birth Rate
b (%) 
a Bankruptcy Rate = 
number of filings for liquidation type bankruptcy
number of companies in existence at end of previous quarter
 
bBirth Rate = 
number of company formations
number of companies in existence at end of previous quarter
   29 
TABLE III 
 Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests 
 
 
















Bankruptcy Rates (BR)                 
All Companies  53,652  0.4428%  0.4260%  0.3750%  0.5200%  0.4459%  33.907***  2.510** 
                 
BR By Legal Form                 
Stock Corporations  17,747  0.3568%  0.3585%  0.2903%  0.4442%  0.3531%  44.806***  4.372*** 
Partnerships  35,905  0.5058%  0.4653%  0.4216%  0.5675%  0.5223%  35.423***  1.497 
                 
BR By Industry Group                 
Manufacturing  4,369  0.4395%  0.3313%  0.2444%  0.5082%  0.4727%  44.185***  1.355 
Construction  5,796  0.4938%  0.4435%  0.3773%  0.5616%  0.5314%  33.976***  1.214 
Trade  16,610  0.4402%  0.3315%  0.2624%  0.5195%  0.5349%  41.038***  0.577 
Services  6,077  0.2132%  0.1717%  0.1407%  0.2239%  0.2611%  27.205***  1.756* 
                 
Macroeconomic Variables                 
∆GDP    2.3555%  2.4451%  3.4503%  2.3064%  1.8506%  8.057**  0.1296 
CYCLE    -7.350  -8.996  -5.400  -9.917  -4.600  9.566***  2.675*** 
CCI    -5.667  -10.000  -5.667  -13.167  1.500  35.396***  5.303*** 
∆EUROZONE    2.5710%  2.5940%  3.2489%  0.7341%  1.8997%  26.160***  0.224 
INFL    2.0002%  2.2291%  2.5337%  2.1239%  1.6238%  4.081  1.567 
∆STOCKS    2.9516%  11.0930%  9.9998%  13.0175%  -3.6000%  5.950*  2.416** 
BIRTHSAll    2.0455%  2.7582%  2.8171%  1.9717%  1.5342%  47.641***  5.102*** 
                 
 
Notes: Quarterly time series data from 1986Q1 to 2002Q4; Variables as defined in Table II; Macroeconomic variables are only given in differenced format if this improves 
information content; All reported summary statistics are medians; Tests for equality of medians across three sub-periods (Ia: 1986Q1-1991Q4, Ib: 1992Q1-1997Q4, II: 
1998Q1-2002Q4): Kruskal-Wallis test statistics (χ² distributed); Tests for equality of medians between two sub-periods (Ib: 1992Q1-1997Q4, II: 1998Q1-2002Q4): 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney T-statistics; *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level 
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TABLE IV 
Relationships between Bankruptcy Rates and Macroeconomic Variables 
       










CODE  Adj. R² 
             
∆GDP  -1.3209** 
(2.468) 





∆CYCLE  -0.0056*** 
(3.946) 





∆CCI  -0.0051*** 
(4.880) 





∆EUROZONE  -1.1652*** 
(4.172) 





∆INFL  -2.0883* 
(1.789) 





∆STOCKS  -0.1862*** 
(3.291) 





∆BIRTHSAll  -9.2690*** 
(2.841) 






Notes: Polynomial distributed lag (PDL) models; Variables as defined in Table II;  dependent variable:  year-on-year change in 
quarterly total small and micro business bankruptcy rates; only cumulative lag coefficients reported; t-statistics based on Newey-West 
HAC standard errors in parentheses; Chow Breakpoint Test statistics for break in 1998Q1; left-hand panel: models without break 
adjustment; right-hand panel: models including jump dummy to control for code change (CODE); *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level   31 
TABLE V 
Bankruptcy Rates and Macroeconomic Variables: by Legal Form 







A  B  C 
       












∆BIRTHSAll  -0.0334 
(0.950) 
–  – 




∆BIRTHSPartnerships  –  – 
0.0249 
(0.668) 












       
Adj. R²  0.4934  0.5823  0.3553 
       
 
Notes: Polynomial distributed lag (PDL) models; Variables as defined in Table II; dependent 
variables:  year-on-year change in quarterly small and micro business bankruptcy rates;  only 
cumulative lag coefficients reported; t-statistics based on Newey-West HAC standard errors in 
parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * 
denotes significance at the 10% level   32 
TABLE VI 
Bankruptcy Rates and Macroeconomic Variables: by Industry 
       
Manufacturing  Construction  Trade  Services 
Variable 
D  E  F  G 
         
















∆BIRTHSManufacturing  -0.0576 
(0.793) 
–  –  – 
∆BIRTHSConstruction  – 
-0.0648 
(0.693) 
–  – 




∆BIRTHSServices  –  –  – 
-0.0507** 
(2.459) 
















         
Adj. R²  0.2156  0.0634  0.3798  0.3359 
         
 
Notes: Polynomial distributed lag (PDL) models; Variables as defined in Table  II; dependent variables:  year-on-year 
change in quarterly small and micro business bankruptcy rates; only cumulative lag coefficients reported; t-statistics based 
on Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at 
the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level 
 
   33 
TABLE VII  
Bankruptcy Rates and Macroeconomic Variables: by Legal Form and Industry 
       
Manufacturing  Construction  Trade  Services 












                 




































–  –  –  –  –  – 





–  –  –  – 





–  – 





































                 
Adj. R²  0.4876  0.2734  0.1034  0.0474  0.4090  0.2491  0.4303  0.0920 
                 
 
Notes: Polynomial distributed lag (PDL) models; Variables as defined in Table 2; dependent variables:  year-on-year change in quarterly small and micro business bankruptcy 
rates; only cumulative lag coefficients reported; t-statistics based on Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes 
























Figure 1. Quarterly Small and Micro Business Bankruptcy Rates 
 
Notes: All limited liability companies; Seasonally-adjusted (Census X12 – multiplicative); Period I (Ia: 1986Q1-
1991Q4;  Ib:  1992Q1-1997Q4):  pre  introduction  of  new  bankruptcy  code;    Period  II  (1998Q1-2002Q4):  post 
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